When the Cubs signed Seiya Suzuki earlier than the 2022 season, it was a part of a daring technique to speed up their return to rivalry. They weren’t fairly prepared for his or her shut up that 12 months, however the basic plan was fairly clear: add just a few items then, tack on extra the next season, and intention for a very good workforce sooner somewhat than later.
Good information! That plan has labored. The Cubs are in playoff place in mid-September, identical to they drew it up. They supplemented 2022’s free company exploits with a double dip final offseason. Cody Bellinger and Dansby Swanson have been proper on the forefront of the cost, although Swanson has slumped not too long ago. But for a bit, it regarded like Suzuki may not be part of Chicago’s plans.
He coasted by means of 2022, a strong righty bat however hardly probably the greatest hitters within the league. He began off this season in a funk, handled accidents, and at last bought benched in early August. It was an extended fall for somebody so heralded, however actually, you’ll be able to see what the Cubs have been considering. Through that time within the 12 months, Suzuki was batting .249/.328/.389, good for a 96 wRC+, and hanging out a worrisome 25.3% of the time. He’d slumped because the 12 months wore on, besides; he had a wRC+ of 59 within the months of June and July.
To put it mildly, it looks as if he figured one thing out. Suzuki returned to the lineup on a full-time foundation on August 9, and he’s been probably the greatest hitters in baseball since then. His wRC+ over that span is 197. He’s hanging out simply 16.1% of the time. He’s cracked seven homers in 118 plate appearances, and he’s doing slightly little bit of every part moreover that. He’s hitting line drives far and wide, and hitting for energy and common. This is the Suzuki everybody hoped to see when he came visiting from NPB final 12 months.
What modified? I believe David Ross identified it properly in speaking about his temporary benching (Ross didn’t name it that, for what it’s price, however it’s fairly clear that he was getting greater than only a few relaxation days). “He’s just in between. If he’s looking heater, they throw him a slider,” he instructed The Athletic’s Sahadev Sharma. The message from the Cubs was clear and constant. “Sometimes these guys get into trying to play cat-and-mouse with the pitcher a little too much,” hitting coach Dustin Kelly identified, pointing to the identical factor.
That’s a type of basic baseballisms that I’m all the time slightly bit skeptical of. That’s what hitting is! They would possibly throw you one thing quick, or they could throw you one thing sluggish. If you’ll be able to’t determine them, that feels to me much less like being in between and extra like not hitting properly. But there’s a time-honored resolution, which Kelly was fast to level out in the identical interview. You simply sit on one in all two speeds and alter if you happen to’re mistaken. Easy peasy.
There’s only one drawback with that naive resolution: it’s not clear which one Suzuki was having bother with specifically. No matter the way you break pitches down, he wasn’t exhibiting any apparent plate self-discipline holes whilst he slumped. Even at his worst, he wasn’t lacking any class of pitch at a very elevated charge in comparison with 2022:
Swing and Miss by Pitch Type
| Type | 2022 SwStr% | 2023 SwStr% | 2022 Whiff% | 2023 Whiff% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fastball | 7.0% | 8.3% | 17.6% | 20.5% |
| Breaking | 11.4% | 9.1% | 31.8% | 23.8% |
| Offspeed | 13.7% | 13.0% | 28.4% | 31.9% |
If there’s something to notice, it’s a barely elevated whiff charge on fastballs. But that’s fairly marginal, not way more than a rounding error. No, the issue got here when Suzuki made contact. The entire level of hitting is to hit the ball exhausting and within the air. You’d additionally choose to drag it; batted ball speeds have a tendency larger on the pull aspect, principally as a result of the bat is shifting at its quickest because it will get out in entrance of the plate, and that’s the place you should meet the ball to drag it. But actually, you need to hit it exhausting and within the air first, and every part else is a bonus.
That’s what everybody anticipated Suzuki to do when he got here to the most important leagues. He was a constantly glorious masher in Japan, with a profession .570 slugging share. But within the States (and, fantastic, sometimes Toronto), he merely didn’t recapture that kind. Through his benching, he’d been hitting roughly 1 / 4 of his batted balls exhausting and within the air, barely lower than the most important league common. He’d managed to hit exhausting, pulled contact within the air on solely about 7.5% of his batted balls, meaningfully lower than the ten% league common. It wasn’t restricted to only one pitch sort, both.
Those issues have been magnified when he was at his worst; he merely wasn’t crushing pitches the way in which you’d anticipate him to. His profile makes plenty of sense if he’s bludgeoning the ball. Acceptable strikeout and stroll numbers and middling nook outfield protection aren’t that attention-grabbing with out energy, although.
For some folks, including energy principally means making an attempt to drag the ball extra. In a great world, I believe each hitter would do some model of that; it’s simply simpler to hit for energy to the pull aspect, full cease. But swings and swing choices are complicated issues. Moving one lever can have an effect on one thing seemingly unrelated, all down the chain. Suzuki was pulling the ball fairly ceaselessly when he hit the ball within the air in 2023, however with out the identical effectivity he displayed final 12 months.
Want that in numbers? Let’s evaluate 2022 to 2023 by means of August 8, the final day earlier than he rejoined the lineup full-time. His pull charge on balls he hit within the air elevated from 16% to twenty-eight%, which sounds glorious. But his slugging share declined by 150 factors on these balls, his anticipated slugging share declined by 120 factors, his wOBA declined by 120 factors, and his xwOBA declined by almost 100 factors. In different phrases, a decline in touch high quality to the pull aspect offset the advantages of getting the ball there extra usually.
Meanwhile, his manufacturing on balls within the air that didn’t go to the pull aspect additionally fell. I’m making a collection of assumptions right here, however it feels to me like he was simply too early on plenty of pitches, so he ended up with extra so-so contact that was however pulled. Plenty of hitters discuss making an attempt to remain up the center with their supposed swing in order that in the event that they search for a fastball and get fooled, they’re pulling offspeed pitches down the road as an alternative of yanking them foul.
If that’s the case with Suzuki, you may think about what an inexpensive tradeoff appears like. Start hanging again extra on fastballs, and he’d have a decrease pull charge when he places the ball within the air. He’d make up for it in two methods, although. First, he’d hit the ball the opposite approach or up the center with extra authority. Second, when he did pull a ball, it will extra doubtless be scalded because of the truth that what’s left within the pull bucket is a bunch of crushable pitches he bought out in entrance of.
Quite frankly, it’s superb how true that’s been. When he debuted final 12 months, he hit a ton of fastballs within the air, however solely 10% of these have been pulled. This 12 months, that quantity climbed above 20% whereas his contact high quality cratered. But lo and behold, he’s hit 23 fastballs within the air since returning, and he’s pulled precisely one in all them. It was the sort of ball you haven’t any alternative however to drag, in on his arms, and he completely blistered it:
Instead, he’s peppering these pitches again up the center or to proper subject. Pretty a lot every part about these balls – manufacturing, anticipated manufacturing, exit velocity, hard-hit charge, you identify it – has improved. In different phrases, his swing is extra on time towards fastballs; he’s assembly them and driving them into the right-center hole with authority way over he did earlier within the 12 months.
Meanwhile, he’s pulling the ball extra ceaselessly when he manages to elevate a slower pitch, a full 33% of the time. He’s completely walloping these balls; he’s put 9 of them into play, and he’s batting 1.000 with a 2.778 slugging share on these 9 balls. His common – common! – exit velocity on them is 101.4 mph. He’s completely scalding this stuff, in different phrases.
In reality, Suzuki isn’t simply crushing breaking balls on accident. He’s searching them. He’s swung at 70% of the in-zone breaking balls he’s seen throughout his current scorching streak, up from 60% in each 2022 and the beginning of this 12 months. That’s extra ceaselessly than he swings at in-zone fastballs. He’s chasing breaking balls extra usually, too, however given what occurs when he catches up with one, that looks like a rational tradeoff.
To be truthful, I could be studying an excessive amount of into it. He’s additionally swinging extra ceaselessly at fastballs, significantly within the strike zone. But the breaking ball swing charges are up extra, they usually appear extra intentional, and significantly, he’s destroying these breaking balls. It looks like a purposeful technique, and one which’s paying dividends instantly.
How lengthy can he sustain this new plan? I don’t need to say indefinitely, however I don’t see any apparent purpose that it must cease. He most likely gained’t hold slugging .915 when he places a breaking ball into play, however the general profile of smashed contact on gentle pitches mixed with strong plate self-discipline speaks for itself. There’s no query Suzuki is on a scorching streak in the intervening time, taking part in above his true expertise degree, however even a back-down-to-earth model of that is a superb hitter.
There will, in fact, be extra changes to return. As he’s gotten extra aggressive towards in-zone gentle stuff, pitchers haven’t modified what they’re throwing him. They’re difficult him simply as ceaselessly with these pitches. If I have been an opposing pitcher, I’d attempt to make the most of Suzuki’s elevated aggression by throwing him extra pitches outdoors of the strike zone. That will undoubtedly occur earlier than lengthy; how he adjusts to the adjustment might be attention-grabbing to observe. But I believe he’ll be capable of deal with it; as I discussed earlier than, he has a very good sense of the strike zone. Tilting his decision-making in direction of swing aggression doesn’t imply he’ll instantly neglect what the zone appears like.
All instructed, I’m tremendously inspired by Suzuki’s current surge. I strive to not learn an excessive amount of into 100-ish PA samples; just about anybody can have a scorching month. But the way in which he’s doing it feels actual to me. This isn’t some fluke of sentimental line drives falling in far and wide or grounders discovering holes within the infield. He’s simply pummeling the ball, and doing it in a approach that fits his sport. Pulling extra fastballs isn’t a cure-all for what ails hitters, and Suzuki’s turnaround is a superb instance. For him, the way in which ahead was trickier than that, however that doesn’t make it much less of an ideal plan.
All statistics on this article are present by means of Saturday, September 9.
Content Source: blogs.fangraphs.com