Did you realize that Andy Warhol didn’t really say “In the future, everyone will be world-famous for fifteen minutes”? I used to be shocked to be taught the reality. Apparently, two museum workers invented the quote after they have been engaged on a Warhol exhibit. That makes the saying extra fascinating to me, really: two nameless folks creating the work of somebody well-known for the democratization of artwork is pleasing. But I digress: the purpose of bringing that quote up is that Nick Anderson is nicely into his second fifteen minutes of fame, and I’m fairly positive that this, too, is one thing Warhol would approve of.
It’s laborious to think about a greater pitcher getting a worse contract than the one Anderson signed this offseason. He was probably the greatest relievers in baseball, interval, from his 2019 debut till tearing his UCL in 2021. Heck, he was high 15 in reliever WAR from 2019 to ’21, and he principally didn’t play in a type of years. Sub-3 ERA, sub-3 FIP, the fourth-highest strikeout price in baseball (39.6%) — Anderson was an elite nearer, and the Rays used him accordingly. The Braves are paying him solely $875,000 this 12 months. That’s some form of discount.
As Esteban Rivera detailed final November, there have been causes to doubt that Anderson would come again sturdy. He regarded diminished in his previous few appearances earlier than hitting the IL; his greatest weapon, a fastball with glorious carry that left batters flummoxed, misplaced its normal carry. Vertical strategy angle is all the fashion in pitch design lately, and that’s the case as a result of it neutralizes the most important weapon hitters have: energy on contact. You can’t hit a house run in the event you can’t hit the ball, and flat-angled four-seam fastballs are nice at doing simply that.
Again leaning on Esteban’s work, there was an issue: when Anderson bought harm, his supply stopped working. More particularly, he stopped producing a flat angle with launch level, as a result of he began releasing the ball increased. Just like that, his fastball went from nice to common. Throw in a heaping serving to of damage uncertainty, and I’m not shocked that risk-averse entrance workplaces weren’t lining as much as provide him an enormous deal.
Right, then; let’s test in on Anderson’s 2023 season:
Same As He Ever Was (Except Strikeouts)
Year | Okay% | BB% | ERA | FIP | xFIP | xERA |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2019 | 41.7% | 6.8% | 3.32 | 2.35 | 2.44 | 2.90 |
2020 | 44.8% | 5.2% | 0.55 | 1.35 | 3.04 | 2.13 |
2023 | 29.8% | 3.2% | 3.20 | 2.44 | 3.04 | 3.21 |
Oh look, he’s mounted! Or, nicely, possibly we are able to’t say that with any certainty, however he’s definitely pitching nicely. I made a decision to look into the uncooked measurables of his fastball to see if the change he’s going for is working, and so as to add in small-sample 2021 so we are able to evaluate pitch shapes to when he was harm. Is he again to a decrease launch level and extra extension? Nope:
Nick Anderson, Release Characteristics by Year
Year | VRel (ft) | HRel (ft) | Extension (ft) |
---|---|---|---|
2019 | 6.56 | -0.7 | 5.9 |
2020 | 6.36 | -0.68 | 6.4 |
2021 | 6.65 | -0.82 | 5.9 |
2023 | 6.63 | -0.53 | 6.1 |
Huh, bizarre. Well, is he again to inducing a ton of vertical break, which makes for a flatter strategy angle? No and no:
Nick Anderson, Vertical Movement by Year
Year | VMov (in) | VMov (w/gravity) | VAA |
---|---|---|---|
2019 | 19.9 | -10.3 | -4.87 |
2020 | 18.9 | -11.4 | -4.56 |
2021 | 18.3 | -13.5 | -5.12 |
2023 | 16.8 | -14.0 | -5.52 |
In reality, Anderson’s fastball is inarguably worse than it was at his peak. Whether we’re speaking chase price, whiff price, swinging-strike price, or simply uncooked velocity, 2023’s model can’t maintain a candle to how the pitch regarded when he was at his greatest (this time, once more, I’m excluding 2021):
Fastball Trending Down
Year | Chase% | Whiff% | SwSt% | Velo (mph) |
---|---|---|---|---|
2019 | 37.9% | 26.7% | 15.8% | 96.0 |
2020 | 47.0% | 27.8% | 17.8% | 95.2 |
2023 | 41.1% | 14.6% | 8.2% | 94.0 |
Anderson clearly is aware of his fastball isn’t as much as its earlier glorious customary. How can I inform? He stopped throwing it. He’s a two-pitch man, with a gyro breaking ball and a fastball, and he’s leaning on that gyro breaking ball greater than ever. He’d thrown it just below 40% of the time in his profession earlier than 2023. This 12 months, it’s as much as a strong 50%.
Luckily for Anderson, his breaking ball has been as much as the duty. It’s a wierd pitch, misleading as a result of it hardly breaks in any respect. He throws it off of his fastball; he does an excellent job of mirroring launch factors between the 2 pitches. Even as his fastball comes out increased and better, it nonetheless seems identical to the curveball (or slider, methods disagree) popping out of his hand.
If you needed to, you can end this evaluation proper there. It’s fairly clear that Anderson’s fastball is worse. It’s equally clear that he’s compensated for that decline by throwing his secondary pitch extra regularly. Hey, neat thought, everybody ought to do this. But as a lot as I hate to say it, I don’t assume that is the top of the story. Much as I wish to, I can’t give Anderson a clear invoice of analytical well being. I believe he’s a couple of batter changes away from turning again right into a pumpkin.
Why? Two causes, actually. First, he isn’t throwing that breaking ball as laborious as he used to. He’s averaging 80.4 mph on the pitch this 12 months, down from 83–84 at his peak. In reality, the quickest one he’s thrown this 12 months has solely been 83.2 mph, slower than his 2019–20 common for the pitch. Velocity is a large a part of the sport for this sort of pitch; giving a hitter much less time to tell apart between a fastball and one thing that vanishes is the very best factor it has going for it. Our two stuff fashions each assume that the pitch is objectively worse this 12 months.
Higher utilization additionally seems like a double-edged sword for a pitch that will get loads of its worth from being a change of tempo. When Anderson was at his greatest, he was drawing chases 40% of the time along with his curveball and working a gaudy 25% swinging-strike price on the pitch. This 12 months, these numbers have plummeted: a 33% chase price and 16.6% swinging-strike price. That’s as a result of batters are swinging much less at it general and in addition making extra contact.
For me, there’s a transparent connection right here. “Throw more secondaries” is among the greatest classes of recent pitching concept, but it surely works higher when your secondaries have a ton of motion. I’m not saying Anderson’s curveball is a foul pitch — it’s clearly not — however notably at its present pace, it’s extra strong than distinctive, and it has to do rather a lot to cowl for his fastball.
You can see this impact all through his recreation, however right here’s a transparent mind-set about it: Anderson has thrown 22 first-pitch curveballs outdoors of the strike zone this 12 months; batters have provided at three of them after swinging twice as regularly in 2019 and ’20 mixed. In an identical vein, he’s drawing fewer chases and fewer swinging strikes with the pitch when he’s forward within the rely, at the very least on a price foundation. That tracks, actually; batters are extra keyed in on the pitch as a result of he’s throwing it extra usually.
For Anderson’s sake, you’d hope that batters paying extra consideration to his curveball would make them late on his fastball. But that hasn’t been the case: he ran a 19% swinging-strike price with the pitch when he was forward within the rely earlier than his damage, however that price has been lower in half this 12 months, whilst he’s shifted his pitch combine away from counting on so many fastballs.
The result’s an unstable equilibrium that I don’t assume will work out in Anderson’s favor in the long term. His fastball was once the inspiration of his recreation. Take that constructing block away, and all the pieces else feels extra unsettled to me. It’s laborious to take a beforehand fastball-dominant recreation and adapt it to go well with a median fastball, notably if you solely throw two pitches.
So far this 12 months, Anderson has made it work. He’s producing a ton of popups, limiting opposing contact high quality along with his fastball, and in addition racking up extra grounders than ever earlier than. He’s additionally strolling nearly nobody; a 3.2% stroll price could make up for lots of issues. Heck, he’s nonetheless hanging out 30% of opponents, although I’m skeptical that may proceed; he’s lacking a median quantity of bats, and it’s laborious to run strikeout charges that top with out extra empty swings than Anderson is creating.
The worst a part of this for me personally is that I actually wish to be incorrect. Anderson’s first 12 months within the majors was my first 12 months at FanGraphs, and he was one of many first gamers I “discovered” as a author. I wrote about him three completely different instances in 2019, most notably when he reeled off a 74% strikeout price in his first six video games with the Rays. I’ve by no means met him, however I really feel a wierd connection to him anyway.
That’s how I really feel, but it surely doesn’t change what I believe. Relievers are notoriously mercurial; they are often dominant sooner or later and gone the following. Anderson might need been probably the greatest relievers within the recreation in Tampa Bay, however that doesn’t make him proof against the regression monster. Pretty a lot each reliever is a couple of slight adjustments away from dominance, but in addition a couple of adjustments away from dropping their edge. Anderson hasn’t fairly hit that time but, however regardless of his strong numbers this 12 months, I can’t shake the sensation that the great instances received’t final. Enjoy his efficiency when you can, Braves followers; relievers, like fame, are ephemeral.
Content Source: blogs.fangraphs.com