It’s arduous for me to clarify how a lot I get pleasure from watching Mookie Betts hit. He has an air of quiet confidence that jogs my memory of how I really feel after I’m at my best. That slider, low and tight? He doesn’t want it, so he’s ignoring it. Fastball away? Eh, he’ll discover one thing higher to assault. Then that good pitch comes by, and he springs into motion, buying and selling his air of barely hid boredom for ferocity.
Luis Robert Jr. is a pleasure to observe as nicely, however for fully totally different causes. He’s a coiled spring on the plate, ready to burst into motion. He’s among the finest athletes in all of baseball and at instances among the finest gamers, interval. His phenomenal bat management and velocity let him feast on pitches everywhere in the plate and even off of it, and you’ll see it in his statistical document: few walks, large swing charges, and a minor strikeout drawback that was minor solely due to his uncommon mixture of energy and make contact with.
Betts and Robert have been very totally different gamers of their respective main league careers. But they share one distinction this yr: they’re the 2 gamers who’ve in the reduction of on their fastball swing charges essentially the most. They’re numbers one and two with a bullet:
Fastball Swing% Decliners
That’s bizarre, isn’t it? The two have very totally different video games, and so they’re each excelling this yr by leaning extra into their kind. Betts is getting again to what he’s all the time finished finest, strolling a ton and placing the ball within the air with abandon when he does deign to swing. Robert has already tied his season excessive for house runs — it’s May 23 as we speak — and is putting out a little bit greater than you’d like with out many walks. And they’ve each finished it by making the identical adjustment.
For Robert, swinging much less all the time felt like a logical development. Swing-happy isn’t a ample description of his strategy; he led all of baseball in fastball swing fee final yr. He swung extra continuously at pitches exterior of the strike zone than Betts swung at pitches general. It wasn’t a fractional distinction, both: Robert’s 48.3% chase fee would make Javier Báez blush; Betts supplied at solely 44.2% of pitches.
Opposing pitchers know that about Robert, and so they’ve all the time had one counter in thoughts: throw him extra sliders. Nearly 30% — 29.7%, to be precise — of the pitches he’s seen in his main league profession have been sliders. That’s the best fee amongst energetic gamers, and certain the best fee ever. It’s no secret: he does a lot injury when he connects, and swings so continuously, that throwing bat-missing breaking balls is the one affordable counter.
Pitchers have leaned into this plan an increasing number of through the years. This yr, there’s virtually no such factor as a fastball rely for Robert. In 0–0 counts, he’s seeing four-seam fastballs and sinkers — cutters are someplace in between, and so I’ve left them out of this evaluation solely — solely 47.1% of the time. That’s a backside quartile fee, and even when pitchers are behind within the rely, they solely throw him fastballs half the time. Robert has all the time killed fastballs, however swinging so much in opposition to fastballs additionally meant swinging so much at every part, and the combo was just too breaking-ball-heavy.
This yr, Robert is swinging at solely 29.1% of first pitches. In his profession earlier than this yr, that quantity was 51.8%. This isn’t him tinkering across the edges; he’s fully modified his sport. No one in baseball has reduce their swing fee by extra. He nonetheless doesn’t have elite, Betts-level pitch recognition. To wit, he’s reduce his swing fee on sliders by solely 4.7%. But the intent is evident: Robert needs to swing much less, which ought to pressure pitchers to interact him on his turf extra continuously.
The plan is working phenomenally nicely. Robert has produced extra runs above common than every other hitter in baseball in opposition to four-seamers this yr, and he’s high 20 for fastballs in mixture. As it seems, letting the occasional fastball go by with no swing isn’t any large deal for him, as a result of those he does supply at are likely to disappear into the outfield air quickly. Ask pitchers how they really feel about throwing Robert a fastball. Just as a result of he swings much less typically doesn’t imply he by no means swings, and nobody needs to present him an opportunity to point out off his prodigious energy.
An amusing results of Robert’s new strategy: he’s by no means been forward within the rely extra continuously than this yr. Despite that, he’s putting out greater than final yr. Why? Running deeper counts means extra strikeouts, even you probably have an incredible batting eye. But it additionally means extra possibilities to swing in advantageous counts, and the loud contact he’s making on these counts is greater than making up for any additional strikeouts.
Most possible, Robert’s present strategy is an unstable equilibrium. Pitchers will most likely begin throwing him extra first-pitch fastballs in some unspecified time in the future. It’s virtually harmful to not, when he’s swinging so sometimes at first pitches after which looking for one thing crushable thereafter. Faced with that, Robert should swing extra; it’s virtually harmful to not, when these could be the most effective pitches he sees in the entire at-bat. But then pitchers should begin throwing him fewer strikes — it’s virtually harmful to not — after which he’ll need to swing much less continuously, and so forth and so forth.
All of this back-and-forth is attention-grabbing, and but it’s fully not like what Betts is doing. He doesn’t see a very low variety of fastballs — he sees greater than league common, the truth is. He didn’t want to regulate his plan to maintain pitchers from exploiting him; it’s been working nicely for a decade. Yet there he’s, on the high of the fastball swing decliners listing subsequent to a man who badly wanted to rein in his aggression.
Look a bit nearer, and Betts’ numbers get extraordinarily attention-grabbing. Last yr was a classic Betts yr — his finest season as a Dodger — however he had some un-Bettsian tendencies underneath the hood. In reality, he swung extra continuously than he ever had in his profession. That adjustment had predictable results: he walked much less typically and struck out barely extra continuously, however he punished the additional fastballs he swung at. He’s by no means turned fastballs into extra-base hits as continuously as he did final yr, a minimum of when it comes to additional bases per fastball seen.
What made Betts change his fastball-attacking methods? For this one, I’ve obtained some charts. Here’s the place he swung at fastballs final yr:
Not dangerous, not dangerous. You can see extra pink than might be excellent on the periphery of the zone, however c’mon, he’s Mookie Betts, he’s good at hitting. It’s a pleasant warmth map.
But right here’s a actually good warmth map, his fastball swings in 2023:
That’s downright beautiful. He’s nonetheless swinging a ton when pitchers give him one thing to drive, however he’s chasing fastballs a microscopic 10.5% of the time, the third-best mark in baseball. Any lower in swings over the center of the plate is offset by fewer swings at marginal pitches.
Can I let you know a secret about Mookie Betts? He’s a feared hitter, but it surely’s not as a result of he smacks fastballs out of the park. Since becoming a member of the Dodgers, he’s hitting .320 with a .628 slugging share when he places a fastball in play. That’s good for a .396 wOBA, roughly common amongst on a regular basis hitters. This isn’t a Juan Soto state of affairs the place swinging at fewer fastballs means much less possibilities to point out off Home Run Derby energy; it’s positively value giving up on the occasional middle-middle fastball in alternate for a ton of additional balls. Heck, Betts has a .373 wOBA *general* in Los Angeles. He doesn’t have to promote out to swing at fastballs; he can choose and select ones he thinks he can obliterate.
“Swing at fewer fastballs” doesn’t sound like a very good plan. But two nice hitters are every doing it this yr, and so they’re each having wonderful seasons. Neither of them is doing it for the sake of swinging at fewer fastballs; in each circumstances, fastball swing fee is a aspect impact. Robert wanted to rein in his general swing-happy methods. Betts needed to deal with swinging at higher pitches to drive. They may need the identical enter (fewer swings at fastballs) and the identical output (strong offensive manufacturing), however the way in which they get from A to B is totally totally different.
The ethical of the story: nice baseball gamers don’t all play alike, and even once they make the identical changes, these changes don’t all do the identical factor. Luis Robert is nothing in any respect like Mookie Betts. He’s additionally so much like Mookie Betts, should you’re taking a look at them in a single explicit means. Isn’t baseball nice?
Content Source: blogs.fangraphs.com