Tim Anderson’s recreation has all the time been a high-wire act. He by no means walks, he chases consistently, he’s fully BABIP-dependent and allergic to hitting the ball within the air, and his protection at shortstop has by no means fairly been nice sufficient to cowl for a down yr on the plate. Over the final 4 seasons, as projection methods crunched the underlying numbers and predicted that he’d plummet to the earth, Anderson refused to look down, placing up a 123 wRC+ and 13.6 WAR. Factoring within the time he misplaced to accidents and a world pandemic, that’s a 4.1-win tempo per 500 PAs, or a 5.9-win tempo per 162 video games. Despite on a regular basis he missed, Anderson was the Twenty seventh-most worthwhile place participant in baseball over that span; solely one of many 26 gamers forward of him appeared in fewer video games.
Anderson’s capability to shoot singles into proper area and spray line drives throughout the complete diamond received him a batting title and a Silver Slugger, and earned him berths within the World Baseball Classic and two All-Star Games. It additionally made him enjoyable to look at, a throwback who put the ball in play and used his legs, but additionally had the pop to blow a recreation broad open.
This season, the wire has snapped. The homerless Anderson has been price -0.9 WAR, and his 49 wRC+ is the worst amongst all certified gamers. After working a .347 BABIP final yr, proper at his profession common, Anderson’s BABIP is .294. Maybe gravity was all the time going to kick on this quick when Anderson’s Wile E. Coyote routine stopped working, however it feels awfully sudden for a participant who put up a 110 wRC+ simply final yr:
ZiPS now tasks Anderson to be price 0.7 WAR in 2024, down from his preseason projection of two.0. That distinction of 1.26 put him in for seventh place on Dan Szymborski’s listing of ZiPS projection decliners and makes it unlikely that his $14 million possibility will get picked up. Obviously, every time a participant’s wRC+ drops from 110 to 49, a couple of factor goes improper. (For the remainder of this text, all stats are by Tuesday night time’s motion.)
Let’s begin with accidents. Anderson hasn’t performed greater than 123 video games since 2018. He frolicked on the IL with a knee pressure this yr, and his dash velocity dropped a full tick, going from 28.3 mph in 2022 to 27.2 mph this yr. He is now barely beneath common as a runner, and a drop that sudden makes it truthful to wonder if his legs are again to 100%. His 4.8% infield hit price isn’t just the bottom it’s ever been, it’s lower than half of the speed he ran in every of the final three seasons. It appears at the very least doable that the 30-year-old Anderson might enhance if and when his decrease half will get again to full energy.
Anderson missed the second half of the 2022 season after surgical procedure to restore the sagittal band in his left center finger, which he tore on a checked swing in early August. It’s affordable to anticipate a dip in energy after that type of hand harm, however whereas Anderson’s hard-hit price is down from 41.2% to 40.4%, his 88.2 mph common exit velocity is equivalent to final yr’s mark, and his Ninety fifth-percentile EV and max EV are literally higher. Anderson’s ISO has fallen from .093 to .041, so energy is unquestionably a part of the issue, however it doesn’t seem that it may be defined by a lack of energy.
That stated, Anderson has actually struggled with velocity this season:
Anderson Isn’t Handling the Hard Stuff
Year | Speed | wOBA | xwOBA | EV | LA |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
2022 | 95+ mph | .330 | .385 | 90 | -0.3 |
2023 | 95+ mph | .181 | .251 | 87 | -9.3 |
2022 | ≤95 mph | .323 | .336 | 88 | 3.7 |
2023 | ≤95 mph | .256 | .294 | 88.4 | 1.9 |
SOURCE: Baseball Savant
He’s seen virtually the very same proportion of pitches at or above 95 mph as he did final yr (simply over 14%), however these pitches account for a disproportionately massive share of his struggles. Strength will not be Anderson’s subject, however no matter is occurring looks as if it’s affecting his capability to catch as much as a fastball.
At this level, I’d usually dive into Anderson’s plate self-discipline, however I’d like to take a look at his batted ball profile first, as a result of it’s the actual headline. If you enterprise over to our batted ball leaderboard and kind by the speed of groundballs to fly balls, right here’s what you’ll see:
2023’s League-Leading Ground-Pounders
Anderson has all the time run excessive groundball charges, however he now has the very best groundball price and lowest fly ball price within the league, each by practically 10 proportion factors. He’s hitting greater than 4 groundballs for each fly ball. His ratio is sort of twice that of Christian Yelich in second place. Do you understand how many groundballs you must hit to depart Christian Yelich consuming your mud? I pulled numbers going all the best way again to 2000. The solely certified participant who ever had a GB/FB as excessive as Anderson’s was Ben Revere, at 4.61 in 2012 and 4.51 in 2014. Revere was a slash-and-dash specialist who hit seven profession house runs. In different phrases, he wasn’t in any respect the type of participant Anderson is.
Anderson’s wOBA on groundballs this yr is .206, a profession low. However, his xwOBA is .242, proper according to earlier seasons. He would possibly simply be getting unfortunate on groundballs, terribly inopportune timing on condition that they make up practically two-thirds of his balls in play. But understand that whereas Anderson’s GB/FB took an enormous bounce this yr, it’s really been growing each single season since 2018.
Anderson’s .535 wOBA on line drives is once more far beneath his .657 xwOBA. His exit velocity is definitely up on line drives, from 93 mph to 94.3 this yr. So once more, there could possibly be some unhealthy luck at play, however look the warmth maps of the place Anderson has been hitting his line drives over the previous 4 years:
Back in 2020 and 2021, he was spraying line drives everywhere in the area. In the previous two years, his line drives have shrunk to the purpose the place they’re both being dumped into proper area for singles or hit proper on the shortstop or first baseman. When he hits one deeper, it’s often straight on the proper fielder for a simple out. As I discussed, Anderson’s xwOBA on line drives has stayed roughly round .665 over the previous three years, however his wOBA has declined from .730 to .661 to .535. Combine that with the warmth maps, and there’s greater than unhealthy luck happening right here. Here’s a fast refresher on the directional worth of line drives over the course of the Statcast period:
Line Drive Directional Value
Direction | wOBA | xwOBA | EV |
---|---|---|---|
Pull | .789 | .720 | 95.6 |
Straight | .641 | .661 | 93.1 |
Oppo | .635 | .590 | 90.4 |
As for fly balls, understand that we’re coping with a particularly small pattern dimension. Over 309 plate appearances and 228 balls in play this yr, Anderson has solely hit 24 fly balls! And it’s not simply that he’s not hitting fewer fly balls. It’s that when he does, he’s hitting them worse:
Tim Anderson’s Fly Balls
Year | Pull% | wOBA | xwOBA | EV | Distance |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
2020 | 14% | .615 | .623 | 94 | 336 |
2021 | 10% | .586 | .574 | 94.2 | 330 |
2022 | 6% | .310 | .450 | 92.2 | 325 |
2023 | 4% | .215 | .264 | 90.6 | 307 |
That’s a profession low for common exit velocity on fly balls. I received’t make you take a look at one other set of warmth maps, however there’s an analogous phenomenon happening. Anderson has been progressively dropping the flexibility to drive the ball to the pull facet. To his detriment, his swing is now geared extra towards hitting the ball on the bottom.
With all that in thoughts, now we are able to check out Anderson’s plate self-discipline. Every season of his profession is listed beneath. It’s a giant chart, however I’d identical to you to note two issues:
Tim Anderson’s Plate Discipline
Season | O-Swing% | Z-Swing% | Swing% | Contact% | Zone% | wRC+ |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2016 | 36.4% | 68.1% | 50.3% | 70.7% | 43.9% | 98 |
2017 | 41.3% | 70.8% | 54.7% | 72.2% | 45.3% | 79 |
2018 | 40.3% | 72.6% | 54.0% | 73.7% | 42.6% | 85 |
2019 | 45.2% | 77.5% | 58.5% | 77.0% | 41.1% | 128 |
2020 | 43.6% | 73.0% | 55.2% | 71.2% | 39.6% | 140 |
2021 | 40.5% | 81.9% | 57.8% | 76.0% | 41.9% | 119 |
2022 | 44.4% | 77.3% | 57.8% | 79.6% | 40.8% | 110 |
2023 | 37.6% | 70.9% | 52.5% | 76.6% | 44.8% | 51 |
The first is that Anderson’s zone price is increased than it’s been since 2017. Pitchers have observed that Anderson isn’t as harmful when he places the ball in play, they usually’re blissful to let him accomplish that. The second is that Anderson’s swing charges this yr most intently resemble these from his first three seasons within the massive leagues, earlier than he turned a real menace on the plate.
Over the course of Anderson’s profession, aggression has been correlated with success. I imply that actually: the correlation coefficient between his chase price and his wRC+ is .66. He has all the time chased greater than the analysts and the projections would have preferred, however that’s what labored for him.
Last yr, Robert Orr launched the concept of a hitter’s “bad decision rate.” Rather than merely take a look at plate self-discipline by way of swing price on pitches both inside or outdoors the zone, he seemed on the areas the place hitters did essentially the most or least harm. Anderson was Orr’s poster boy, with the most important distinction between his chase price and unhealthy resolution price, as a result of he made nice contact on pitches off the sting of the plate down and away.
Here’s what that appears like in a warmth map. On the left, is Anderson’s slugging proportion on balls in play from 2018-2022. In the center is his swing price throughout these years. On the fitting is his swing price this yr:
On the left, we are able to see that Anderson was greatest on pitches over the center and barely down, however there was nonetheless loads of yellow everywhere in the zone (besides the corners), in addition to barely beneath the zone and out of doors, as Orr famous. In the center, we are able to see that his swing choices mirrored that data. He swung at all the things, significantly low and away. On the fitting is that this yr’s swing price. Anderson nonetheless runs a really excessive chase price, however he’s rather more centered center away. That’s additional away from the areas the place he does essentially the most harm, and it’s additionally an important recipe for hitting the ball on the bottom the opposite manner.
It’s not simply that Anderson is wanting down and away, it’s {that a} increased proportion of his swings are at pitches that have a tendency to finish up there:
His swing price on breaking pitches has dropped only a hair, however his swing charges in opposition to fastballs and offspeed pitches have dropped dramatically. That’s a fairly horrible tradeoff, as a result of Anderson has a profession wOBA of .346 when he swings at fastballs and .321 when he swings at offspeed stuff, however simply .260 when he swings at breaking balls. I don’t know what got here first. Maybe Anderson is shedding fastballs as a result of he is aware of he can’t deal with them proper now, or possibly his extra passive strategy is the explanation that he’s not equipped sufficient to meet up with them.
None of that is for lack of effort. “I’ve have been working. I have been hitting, hitting a ton,” Anderson just lately advised MLB.com. “It’s just part of the process. It’s going to help me in the future. We can’t see it yet, but it’s something that everybody has their turn of going through something.”
I’ve written an entire lot of phrases right here, and I’m not as close to to a conclusion as I would really like. For no matter cause, Anderson has been too passive this yr. Not too passive for a standard hitter, however too passive for Anderson. As is so typically the case, passivity in pitch choice has changed into passivity through the pitch. He’s much less more likely to swing on the inside pitch. He’s much less more likely to assault a pitch out in entrance of the plate, the place he might do extra harm and carry the ball. He’s extra content material than ever to let the ball get deep and shoot it the opposite manner, however he’s much less adept at it than in earlier years.
I don’t think about he’s acquired one other 140 wRC+ season in him, however I’d be shocked if that is the top for Anderson. His recreation is a high-wire act, however it has labored earlier than, and the contact abilities he possesses usually aren’t ones that disappear the precise second a participant turns 30. Besides, anybody who drops 60 factors of wRC+ with a 45-point hole between their wOBA and xwOBA goes to be due for some regression. DRC+, which makes use of greater than outcomes to measure a batter’s contributions, by no means liked Anderson as a lot as wRC+ did when he was flying excessive (115 DRC+ in 2020, versus 140 wRC+), however it hates him a lot much less now that he’s going splat (76 DRC+, versus 49 wRC+).
The White Sox may not decide up his possibility for subsequent yr, however supervisor Pedro Grifol is decided to show his religion in Anderson, batting him within the two-hole daily and telling reporters, “I trust him. I believe he’s going to turn this around and be the player he’s always been.” Anderson has actually earned the prospect to strive.
Content Source: blogs.fangraphs.com